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Abstract 
 
In recent years, both developing and industrialised societies have experienced riots and civil 
unrest over the corporate exploitation of fresh water. Water conflicts increase as water 
scarcity rises and the unsustainable use of fresh water will continue to have profound 
implications for sustainable development and the realisation of human rights. Rather than 
states adopting more costly water conservation strategies or implementing efficient water 
technologies, corporations are exploiting natural resources in what has been described as the 
“privatization of water”. By using legal doctrines, states and corporations construct fresh 
water sources as something that can be owned or leased. For some regions, the privatization 
of water has enabled corporations and corrupt states to exploit a fundamental human right. 
Arguing that such matters are of relevance to criminology, which should be concerned with 
fundamental environmental and human rights, this article adopts a green criminological 
perspective and draws upon Treadmill of Production theory.  
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Introduction 
‘On 28 July 2010, through Resolution 64/292, the United Nations General Assembly 
explicitly recognized the human right to water and sanitation and acknowledged that 
clean drinking water and sanitation are essential to the realisation of all human rights.’ 
(United Nations, 2013). 
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Conflicts over fresh water, notably in arid regions such as the Middle East and Africa, have 
occurred for thousands of years (Barnaby, 2009; Pacific Institute, 2014). These historical 
disputes have arisen from water scarcity in areas scourged by drought and able to access only 
finite water resources. In more recent times, the politics of water, driven by entities seeking to 
profit from water shortages and government moves to tax freshwater, have led to riots, arrests 
and deaths in countries such as Bolivia and Ghana (Bennett, 1995; Olivera, 2004) as well as 
countries of the affluent West. These water conflicts have included unprecedented police 
clashes and deaths of innocent civilians in South Africa (BBC News, 2014a); the United 
Nations intervention in Detroit, USA after weeks of public protest (Burns, 2014); and  
hundreds of thousands of people protesting in Ireland (BBC News, 2014,b; Irish Times 
2015). These events indicate that the privatization of water has become a criminological issue 
for states whether or not their citizens are experiencing water scarcity or water abundance. 
Such unrest promises to escalate in an era of growing water shortages.  
Surprisingly then, criminological scholarship examining issues associated with fresh water is 
scarce but the body of work that does exist provides critical contributions. Most works have 
focussed on the pollution of water supply, local waterways and tablelands from (legal and 
illegal) industry, transportation and mining activities (Grabosky, 1989; Smandych and 
Kueneman, 2010; Pearce and Tombs, 1998); or the privatization of water for corporate 
interests (Benton, 1998; White, 2003). In order to add to criminological scholarship, this 
article draws on green criminology to explore the legal and political frames underpinning 
fresh water exploitation. For our purposes, green criminology encompasses (but is not 
restricted to) studies that contribute to the ‘pursuit of social justice and human rights’ by 
identifying and exposing environmental problems and exploring them within the context of 
entrenched inequalities and historical trends (South and Brisman, 2013:99). Specifically, this 
article integrates political economy theories, in particular ecological Marxism and treadmill 
of production (ToP) (Lynch et al, 2013; Stretesky et al, 2013) into an analysis of fresh water 
governance.  
The article begins by examining the legal constructs of property and rights relating to water 
with a particular focus on governance of the Commons. This discussion highlights the role of 
the state and corporate entities in undermining access to water through the creation of various 
legal constructs, as well as the conflict between capital accumulation and nature (Stretesky et 
al, 2014). After presenting the context and theoretical approach, the article explores two case 
studies:  the privatization of public water supplies in the London and Thames Valley region, 
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England; and the global market for bottled water. The article adds to green criminological 
scholarship by weaving together a developing theoretical approach with analysis of the legal 
and political constructs underpinning freshwater governance and grounding this analysis in 
discussion of two examples. 
Treadmill of Production and Ecological Disorganization 
Lynch and Stretesky (2014:139) argue that green crimes occur concomitantly with human 
induced environmental harms. Environmental ‘problems’ are thus perpetuated by modes of 
production that form an essential component of contemporary ‘local and global political 
economies’ (ibid). For Stretesky et al (2014) the taken-for-granted assumptions that present 
ongoing economic growth and fiscal prosperity as a necessary and essential social and global 
good must be challenged. Drawing on Allan Schnaiberg’s 1980 ecological Marxism and his 
Treadmill of Production theory, Stretesky et al (2014) demonstrate how market-oriented, 
advanced neo-liberal societies are responsible for ongoing environmental harm. Central to 
ToP is that capitalism, with its expanding technologies, is intrinsically environmentally 
destructive. For Schnaiberg (1980) and Gould et al (2004), the extraction of natural resources, 
the deforestation of woodlands and habitats, and the exploitation of flora and fauna, are 
essential ingredients in the capitalist ToP process that results in ‘ecological disorganization’. 
The treadmill is driven by a perpetual need to service  consumer society, with the supply and 
demand of expanding markets and trade-oriented economic policies  underpinning 
contemporary globalised international relations and providing the fabric and  essence of 
environmental despoliation. The ongoing commercialisation and commodification of 
products, resources and global commons, for example, fuel the treadmill through expanding 
trade and consumption. As such, governing rationales premised on capitalist ideologies are, 
according to Stretesky et al (2014), both responsible for environmental destruction and 
incapable of redressing ongoing harm. The inability to reverse environmental damage or the 
‘law of entropy’ is crucial to their critique of ecological disorganization. According to this 
critique, the commercial processes of production exploit and manipulate the natural 
environment for power and profit and as a result, disrupt, reorganise and disfigure the 
ecological balance that sustains environmental stability and development. This article 
integrates the essence of ToP, namely a political economy analysis of ‘production, 
conservation and entropy’ (Stretesky et al 2014:20) as they relate to fresh water and in doing 
so, critiques the role of both state and corporation in perpetuating environmental damage and 
injustice. 
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Fresh Water Issues 
Fresh water constitutes only 2.5% of all water on our planet, however, the majority of this 
small amount remains captured in ice caps and other inaccessible areas (Black et al, 2009; 
Cullet, 2009). Currently, one billion people worldwide have irregular access to safe drinking 
water (WaterProject, 2013) and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs has identified 45 countries that experience severe water stress or scarcity, the majority 
of which are in Africa. By 2030, humanity’s annual water requirements will exceed current 
sustainable supplies by forty per cent (USICA, 2013). 
Unequal access to fresh water has been exacerbated by a number of converging factors. The 
UN Water Report outlined the top ten drivers of water scarcity as: agriculture; climate change 
and variability; demography, economy and security; ethics, society and culture (e.g. equity); 
governance and institutions; infrastructure; politics; technology and water resources 
(including groundwater and ecosystems) (UNESCO, 2012: 4). Accordingly, the major causes 
of water scarcity (e.g. agriculture and climate change) directly relate to the overriding 
emphasis on economic growth over environmental and human health.  
Water scarcity has been cast by the United Nations in economic terms of excess demand and 
limited supply.  More specifically, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) has identified several dimensions of water scarcity. These dimensions are: (i) 
scarcity where there is a physical lack of water availability (e.g. during droughts); (ii) 
deficiencies in the infrastructure required for controlling, storing, distributing and accessing 
water; (iii) institutional inability to deliver the required water services (‘economic water 
scarcity’) (FAO, 2008). This definition of water scarcity does not prioritise a particular 
regulatory response but it does  construct water scarcity as an economic issue, including 
through use of the words ‘demand’, ‘supply’ and even ‘scarcity’. If water scarcity is an 
economic issue, the argument that naturally follows is that a market-based approach should 
be taken to address water issues. But this approach ignores the fact that capitalist 
development and market approaches have been among the causes of water scarcity. This 
point aligns with political economy theories, grounded in ecological Marxism, regarding the 
ways in which capital accumulation and production relationships (property rights, trade 
liberalisation etc) degrade and destroy water, which is one of the natural resources on which 
production and humanity rely (see e.g., O’Connor 1998: 128).  
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As a result of scarcity and recognition of its value, fresh water is becoming an increasingly 
lucrative investment. As one hedge-fund advisor remarked, an emerging worldwide fresh 
water scarcity is providing ‘serious profit opportunities for those in the know… The 
Aqueduct Alliance database/ maps will show where those opportunities are located…If you 
play it right… the results of this impending water crisis can be very good’ (Nelson, 2012). 
The bourgeoning fresh water industry is estimated to be worth 1 trillion US$ a year and has 
produced major new corporate conglomerates such as the Aquaduct Alliance (which brings 
together Goldman Sachs, General Electric, Coca Cola, Dow Chemicals, United Technologies, 
Talisman Energy and Bloomberg). These large transnational corporations, some with dubious 
and reprehensible records of water abuse and contamination, are now creating databases that 
chart water supplies and identify risks and opportunities for business.  
The Institute for Water Management suggests that the main reason that fresh water 
availability is now raising serious questions is poor governance, including a lack of 
commitment from ineffective institutions that should be addressing and mitigating the drivers 
of water scarcity outlined above (Molden, 2003:17). This leads to the suggestion that poor 
water governance can drive water scarcity - although it could also be a critical tool for 
challenging current unsustainable and unjust uses (Morgan 2011: 3). The authors agree with 
this latter point and suggest that as green criminology brings to light how legal arrangements 
are constructed and why they have failed to ensure the sustainable and equal distribution of 
water, it could play a role in shaping what good water governance is.   
 
Market-based solutions are generally seen as the preferred governance arrangements for 
dealing with fresh water issues. This is evident in international water policies, such as 
principle 4 of the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development 1996, which 
provides that ‘Past failure to recognise the economic value of water has led to wasteful and 
environmentally damaging uses of the resource’. It is also clear in the inclusion of water in 
the world trade regime through the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and by the 
promotion of water privatization by international institutions.  Those promoting water 
privatization include: international water companies,i consultancy firms,ii state organs and 
international financial institutions. Specifically, the World Bank (1993) has played a major 
role in promoting water privatization to developing countries as part of its structural 
adjustment programs (see e.g. McDonald and Ruiters 2005: 32).  
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Because corporations cannot be held directly accountable for human rights breaches or acts 
that might be conceived as ‘ecocide’ (Higgins et al, 2013), it is questionable whether 
deregulation through neoliberal state governance is the ‘good governance’ response required 
for providing and sustaining water access on an equitable basis. Regulatory preferences for 
market-based responses tend to reflect the interests of powerful trans-national corporations 
(TNCs) over water users (encompassing human and non-human animals). Lynch and 
Stretesky (2003: 233) explain that such an approach stems from a corporate ‘…emphasis on 
reduced self-regulation, greater corporate control, a reduction in law and a greater reliance on 
forms of power for influencing law and its enforcement’. To expand on this, the focus on 
market-based approaches to freshwater issues is aligned with how good governance and 
‘common sense’ are currently constructed in mainstream discourses.  This construction takes 
place through the mobilisation of images and messages of greenwashing, pro-environmental 
concern and corporate social responsibility as well as political donations from the private 
sector. Such an approach directs attention away from the fact that it is corporate interests that 
both drive the degradation and devastation of water sources and create selective and 
exclusionary forms of control over access to fresh water.  
 
 
Legal and Political Constructs in Freshwater Governance  
Freshwater governance has a number of underlying doctrinal foundations. These doctrines 
are: sovereignty; property (including private property and common property); and rights and 
entitlements to water (Fisher, 2009:61). These will be briefly outlined to explore legal 
constructs that support state and corporate interests in relation to fresh water, often at the 
expense of local interests and future generations of water users.  
Sovereignty 
States have permanent sovereignty (ultimate authority) over natural resources within their 
territory.  Private parties can exploit natural resources and may have the relevant legal 
consent, or property or contractual rights, to access and use these. However, notionally, States 
can prevent or stop such activities if they provide compensation to the private entity. UN 
Resolution 1803 affirms that sovereign rights override the legal rights of others such as 
contractual or property rights, explaining, for example, that expropriation of the resources can 
be done by sovereign states ‘…for reasons of public utility, security or national interest’ and 
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this is because exportation for public purposes overrides ‘…purely individual or private 
interests, both domestic and foreign’.iii This means that, theoretically, a state can expropriate 
freshwater sources that private entities have control over. The issue is then state involvement 
in unsustainable, unjust water exploitation. Here, sovereignty acts as a significant barrier to 
international review of such activities despite the involvement of TNCs.  
The Restrictive Theory of Territorial Sovereignty has received international support in its 
application to water,iv and has been incorporated into international case law.v Principle 21 of 
the Stockholm Declaration provides that while States have ‘…the sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources’ this right is tempered by ‘the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause harm to the environment of other States or 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’.vi The principle is further reflected in the Rio 
Declaration,vii a number of multi-lateral environmental treaties,viii and in international 
principles more generally such as the principle of good neighbourliness.ix  
Two binding legal instruments regulating fresh water sources are the UN Conventions on the 
Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercoursesx (UNWC) and the Convention 
on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Water 
Convention).xi Both of these instruments only recently came into force and are largely based 
on the Restrictive Theory of Territorial Sovereignty. The predominant focus of the UNWC is 
balancing uses of watercourses flowing between state boundaries, while the focus of the 
Water Convention is water quality issues and the ecological connections between water and 
land resources (Tanzi, 2000: 5). Despite these differences, the two conventions are 
complementary as they each provide a framework for bilateral and multilateral agreements 
and they provide a link between water quantity and water quality. Furthermore, they both 
directly refer to international law principles related to equity and sustainable development. 
However, these instruments do not directly address, or provide guidance on, the privatization 
of water. Nor do these legal instruments emphasise the need for states to regulate domestic 
industries to protect the human right to water and pursue sustainable development. This, 
coupled with their lack of state signatories, prevents the instruments from addressing some of 
the issues that flow from water privatization (Rieu-Clarke and Loures, 2009).  
In relation to the privatization of water, the restrictive theory of territorial sovereignty may be 
useful where the fresh water is in a transboundary source (e.g. a river), but this principle does 
not allow international involvement in relation to purely domestic fresh water sources. 
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Because of this, the theory has limited application to issues stemming from water 
privatization, particularly so as most water sources are not transboundary. From a green 
criminological perspective, the law is limited in a way that supports through omission the 
expansion of the capitalist system, potentially at the expense of promoting sustainable and 
equal distribution of water. This void in international law, coupled with the growing role of 
TNCs at all levels of governance, suggests that state sovereignty is increasingly being 
chipped away at in the area of water governance. The capacity of TNCs (particularly those 
involved in fresh water privatization), to have so far avoided effective regulation, illustrates 
the extent of their power and influence.  
Property  
The application of property law to fresh water sources has become part of the search for a 
solution to the global water crisis where cost-effective technologies alone can only make 
small inroads into meeting the challenge of a multidimensional issue (Chong et al, 2010; 
Shannon et al, 2008). Subsequently, the ‘commodification of water’, largely through use of 
legal avenues, has been represented as an innovative and efficient approach to water 
conservation. However, this transference of water from a ‘public good’ to a ‘private 
commodity’ has also been widely condemned (Benvenisti, 1996: 388).  
In this context, common property refers to an identifiable group of people (e.g. a local 
community) holding a right to use over a specific fresh water resource. Each member of the 
group has the right to use, provided this is in accordance with the norms and rules for 
management of the resource (Fisher, 2009: 69). Accordingly, where water users communicate 
and establish clear arrangements for use, and these institutional arrangements involve 
monitoring and sanctioning, then it will likely result in mutual gains  (Williamson et al., 
2003: 13–14). 
 
If entities can withdraw from water resources, but they have not negotiated and created 
arrangements for such withdrawals, or if there is no or little authority to create or enforce 
rules, then the water source is not common property (Blonquist, 1998: 1–2; Ostrom et al., 
1994: 15). In these situations, the water resource is more likely to be unsustainably used as it 
becomes a ‘free for all’ or an ‘open access resource’ (Ostrom et al., 1994: 15). Arguably, any 
potential collective benefits will become a lost opportunity (a ‘tragedy of the commons’).   
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A state can choose whether to accept that a freshwater source is part of ‘the commons’ or 
whether it is an ‘open access resource’ that is potentially being misused or at least 
inefficiently used. This allows corporate, government and other interests to argue that the 
water source should be privatised in order to protect it. In these situations both states and 
corporate interests play a critical role in constructing water as a ‘problem’ as well as 
‘property’.  
 
Yet, fresh water sources do not fit neatly within the bounds of property law. In particular, 
freshwater sources beneath the ground, or flowing through rivers generally, cannot become 
private property because the water is constantly moving and flowing into other water sources 
or geological containers. As an alternative to privatization, a large body of work illustrates 
that user self-governance, where users are cooperative and develop self-governing 
institutional arrangements, can manage shared resources more efficiently and sustainably 
than privatization (See, e.g., Ostrom, 2010; Cavalcanti et al 2013; Sarker et al 2014).  
 
Nevertheless, water on privately owned or leased land can be considered private property 
depending on the applicable domestic laws (Dudley, 1992: 759). In fact, a water molecule 
will be subject to different property rights as it follows the natural cycle. Porter (2014: 10) 
uses spring water in Texas as an example of this and explains that once a water molecule is 
released from underground, it is privately owned by the landowner. As the water molecule 
flows into a river, the state owns it and it becomes subject to public property rights. As a 
result of this legal construct, water sources connected to land have fuelled land and water 
grabbing. In fact, (Rulli et al., 2013) found that ‘land and water grabbing are occurring at 
alarming rates in all continents except Antarctica’. These findings indicate the harms 
associated with shifting legal constructs in relation to property and water where there are not 
similar legal protections in place for local community water users. 
 
Another way to obtain private property rights over water resources is to be granted these 
rights from the state. Resourceful corporations, as opposed to local communities or users, are 
perhaps best able to negotiate these complex dealings, especially where custom and 
customary laws are traditionally used to sustainably manage water resources. TNCs and 
international finance institutions have encouraged developing states to formulate legally 
strong and enforceable systems of property rights while at the same time reducing barriers to 
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foreign investment. Leading to a situation where TNC private property rights over water 
interfere with the customary and human rights of local communities.  
 
In summary, private property rights over water are created by the state and the uptake of this 
legal fiction is influenced by private entities through lobbying, contractual arrangements and 
international laws and agreements. Granting private property rights over water is one way 
states enable corporate entities to expand the freshwater economic sector, which in turn both 
increases withdrawals of freshwater and decreases the access of others to freshwater. There is 
a clear intersection here between expanding notions of private property and the underlying 
rationale of ToP that capitalism continually expands and in doing so is environmentally 
destructive. In relation to property over fresh water then, corporate entities that control (or 
have power over) fresh water sources are owners of a means of production, which gives them 
the ability to profit from such production (e.g. from water users or supply). These actors are 
then able to reinvest these profits into production systems (e.g. increased irrigation, expanded 
bottled water markets, or value-added water products) that in turn expand consumption and 
production, which in this context means ever increasing withdrawals of water.  
 
A green criminological perspective views the expanding private ownership over water, which 
is constructed as a way to respond to fresh water environmental and social issues, as a 
method employed by states and driven by private actors to speed up the treadmill.  As 
Schnaiberg et al (2000: 4) argues, underpinning this regulatory approach is the ‘…untenable, 
almost magical, sense that any type of economic expansion will reduce social and ecological 
problems’.   
 
Rights and Entitlements  
The appropriation of fresh water under property rights regimes can be incompatible with 
guaranteeing human rights, and particularly the right to water and food (Bakker, 2007). 
McClanahan (2014: 408) argues that the privatization of water raises ‘issues of equitable 
access’ and also fails to deliver the kind of effective service that private sector investment and 
control is supposed to deliver. In fact, according to McClanahan, ‘privatization can result in 
reduced water quality’, a point supported by White (2009: 68-69) who argues:  
Corporatization of state agencies—the processes by which agencies are managed as 
corporate, profit-seeking entities—has led to serious issues of water quality in the 
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developing world. Either by mismanagement of treatment operations in the pursuit of 
profits, or in the denial of safe water to impoverished populations unable to afford the 
high costs of privatized water, as many as 5 million people—primarily children—die 
each year from illnesses caused by poor-quality drinking water or reduced access to 
affordable clean water. 
 
The issue of private control and human rights breaches illustrates a conflict between private 
property rights and human rights, and suggests that a rights-based, comprehensive 
criminological inquiry is needed into the impacts of water privatization. Significantly, the 
privatization of water under property regimes has fuelled resistance to the recognition of a 
human right to water. For example, countries such as Canada and companies such as Nestle, 
were opposed to such a human right, allegedly because of concerns that it may create a legal 
barrier to privatising water sources (Clark, 2010). Despite progress, the human right to water 
is only recognised in non-binding legal instruments, and so whether or not the right is 
enforceable is still debatable. While the construction of water as a commodity has flourished 
due to the privatization of water, the acceptance of a human right to water has struggled for 
acceptance.   
If a human right to water continues to be recognised and strengthened at the international 
level, then states will be under more pressure to fulfil this right (Shue 1996: 62). Such an 
obligation will include taking actions to ensure corporate entities do not interfere with the 
right, whether the entities are involved in water pollution or providing access to water. Yet, 
this presupposes that the state will try to meet its human rights obligations as a response to 
international pressure. Meanwhile, corporate entities are still able to operate in a regulatory 
void where they are generally not held liable for human or environmental harms.xii 
While international actors have been somewhat successful in creating a human right to water 
in recent times, implementing such a right in the context of the globalised, capital 
accumulation model is incredibly problematic. The trend towards states creating private 
property rights over water, and the ensuing corporate control over water in order to 
accumulate capital and wealth, is at odds with redistributing and sustainably using freshwater 
sources. More broadly, the inability of human rights to protect fresh water users, again 
illustrates an underlying conflict between capital accumulation and environmental and human 
health. In this way, green criminologists, the authors included, need to heed the argument of 
Lynch et al (2013: 1009) and not ‘shy away from connecting capitalism to ecological crime’. 
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Summary of Legal Constructions and the Privatization of Water   
The shift described here represents the successful neo-liberal commodification of nature, new 
in its breadth and implications but tracing ToP theories and more generally ecological 
Marxism. Regulatory discourses related to the privatization of water are based on the idea 
that capital accumulation and profit maximization in relation to water increases access and 
improves equality and efficiency. This ‘common sense’ is reinforced by the discourses that 
construct water privatization as a legitimate policy objective for the attainment of water 
security and through the existing legal frameworks that have created this ability to privately 
own water.  Moreover, the inability of human rights to protect access to water, illustrated by 
the lack of enforcement mechanisms, and the lack of effective international laws regarding 
fresh water issues, shows how any resistance is weakened by the globalized, capitalist model.  
At the same time, the way water issues are framed in socioeconomic and legal spaces 
reinforces market-based responses as reasonable and appropriate ways to address the 
underlying human need for water. The privatization of water, expansion and exploitation, 
indifference and irresponsibility, are all constructed as legal and legitimate. But they are not 
without their costs and injustices. These are points of interest to law and to criminology, and, 
in particular, to green criminology that is concerned with relations between humanity, other 
species and the environment. Crime in this sense refers to both ‘existing legal definitions of 
environmental crime, as well as sociological analyses of environmental harms not necessarily 
specified by law’ (Walters 2010, 180).  
Green Criminology and the Exploitation of Water 
The above legal constructions identify governing principles that perpetuate market models of 
regulation and create inequities and injustices in the distribution of fresh water. As discussed, 
the eminent political economist and Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom argued that legal 
instruments, like the ones outlined above, undermine the necessary collective action needed 
to sustainably develop global commons (Ostrom, 1990). When the atmosphere, water, soil 
and air become commodities for commercial exchange, not only are the essentials of human 
life unevenly accessed and distributed but such global commons are threatened by 
governance models that prioritise trade over preservation (Ostrom, 1994; Ostrom and Hess, 
2007).   
With regard to water, White (2003:67) argues that a green criminology approach would note 
that: 
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the financial attraction of privatising and commodyfying drinking water is perfectly 
understandable. First, it is obviously a basic requirement of human life, water is 
always needed, and therefore, marketable. Second, restricted quantities of clean water 
make it a particularly valuable property for those who own and control it….    
 
Following these points, there are a number of examples we could explore to emphasise the 
relevance of a green criminological analysis to freshwater, for example: theft of water 
(Global Initiative, 2014; Njeru, 2012); water-related corruption and violence; water market 
price fixing (Kenya Water for Health Organisation, 2009: 27). In order to build upon this 
emerging area, the following sections explore through a green criminological lens the 
corporate exploitation of freshwater in two contexts. The first is the development of 
privatized markets for public water supply using the London water company, Thames Water, 
as an example. The second context is the market for bottled water. Both examples illuminate 
the inherent injustices and inequities in international regulatory arrangements that privilege 
and mobilize corporate capital over global commons leading to what Schnaiberg (1980) 
refers to as ‘ecological disorganization’ (essentially, unstable ecosystems). 
Privatising Water in a Dysfunctional Market:   Thames Water Company 
In the UK, examining the record of the privatized water companies, the investigative 
journalist Nick Cohen (2013) argues that successive governments have been negligent by 
allowing ‘dubious companies ...to take over a vital national interest.’  In line with the conflict 
between fundamental human rights and capital accumulation, as well as the legally-attributed 
goal of profit-maximisation, these companies have not behaved with probity or in the best 
interests of their customers. Cohen finds that these water corporations are involved in: 
…widespread tax avoidance ... hidden …behind the high walls of commercial 
confidentiality [and] [m]ost egregiously, they have loaded their books with debt, not 
to improve Britain's decaying network of sewers and pipes, but to provide fantastic 
returns to investors from a captive market of consumers.  
 
Although Cohen’s criticisms extend to all the privatized water companies in the UK, he 
focuses on the example of Thames Water, which is the provider of water and wastewater 
services for most of Greater London and several counties of South-East England. Similar to 
the situation in developing countries, the privatization of Thames Water generated high 
profits and returns to shareholders but the logic of privatization as a way to draw in private 
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investment thereby freeing public funds for other projects, was proven false. Thames 
Water has required government funding to enable it to build a new and much needed super-
sewer through London. Nor was the average citizen a beneficiary of this privatization through 
dividends. This is because what followed was not a share-owning democracy, as promised by 
advertising campaigns and capitalist ideologies more generally but rather share-ownership 
concentration among investment institutions and consortia.  In this particular case, Cohen 
observes that Thames is ‘controlled by a consortium led by Macquarie, an Australian bank’ 
yet:  
Despite making healthy profits for years, the company is too enfeebled by debt to 
fund a major building project without taxpayer support. ... If it were a respectable 
company operating in any kind of functioning marketplace, Thames Water would 
have had to have changed its ways years ago or go bust.  
 
This example highlights the dysfunctional state of the water market as a result of corporate 
concentration. Furthermore, it indicates that the privatization of water is very functional for a 
few but much rests on financial behaviour that in other contexts and to other audiences might 
be construed as close to fraud and criminal tax avoidance. In relation to Thames Water, 
Cohen found that:  
The level of debt is the thread that ties incompetence, negligence, tax avoidance and 
over charging together. It allows private equity firms to leverage their original 
investment and increase their returns exponentially. It also allows them to escape tax. 
If they raise equity, they must pay tax on profits before they can give dividends to 
shareholders. If they raise loans, however, they can charge the interest payments 
against tax. 
 
Carrington and Barnes (2013) reported on an investigation by the Observer newspaper in 
November 2012. This investigation ‘revealed that three of Britain’s biggest water companies 
paid little or no tax on their profits in 2012 while generously rewarding their executives and 
investors.’  Likewise, Boffey (2012: 6-7) draws on research commissioned by the M.P. Simon 
Hughes and carried out by Martin Blaiklock, a former director of utilities at the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This research investigated the ‘workings of the 
maze that was Thames Water’s company accounts and others’ and the findings of this 
exercise are particularly stark. Blaiklock discovered: 
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...a system that …is letting down the customers and the taxman and one that appears 
to be repeated across the UK, where 75% of water companies are owned by private 
equity firms. The first part of the jigsaw is an annual bumper dividend paid to 
investors or to companies which are often their own subsidiaries, sometimes offshore, 
and which rip out funds that publicly owned waterworks might once have kept aside 
for infrastructure investment. 
 
As well as setting up convoluted ownership structures, including subsidiary holdings based in 
tax havens such as the Cayman Islands, the water companies deliberately pursue a twin 
strategy of paying out large dividends (to external investors but also to their owners) and also 
paying off the large debts incurred by these same owners when they borrowed the money 
needed to buy the water companies.  As Blaiklock concluded, the result ‘was undoubtedly a 
severely weakened balance sheet’ (Boffey, 2012: 6). This in turn means that the profits of the 
water companies have been diverted away from their liabilities and so they become ‘unable to 
invest in large-scale projects and ... ever more reliant on rises in water bills to pay their way’, 
and on the support of government to subsidise major infrastructure projects (Boffey, 2012: 6).  
In addition to all this, corporate tax arrangements building on these high levels of debt 
repayment and capital allowances allow companies to be exempt from, defer or offset various 
taxes. As Boffey (2012: 6) reports, the examination of the UK water industry pursued by 
Blaiklock and Hughes ‘discovered that little corporation tax is being paid by  major water 
companies – in some years none at all.’ For example:  
Thames water enjoyed a tax rebate of £79.6m in 2011-12 and paid just £26m in tax 
the previous year, despite a net cash inflow for that year of £943.1m. Yorkshire paid 
just £2.9m [in 2011] and £11.1m in the year before, despite an operational profit of 
£303m. In 2012, for the regulated part of Anglian water’s business, the company paid 
no corporation tax at all. In 2011 it paid £500,000 corporation tax on the profits and in 
2010 it was £1.4m. 
 
For Hughes, the M.P. who raised this issue with the House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee, the question was whether there is ‘a particular problem in the water industry, 
which is a regulated monopoly with high capital requirements and which allows companies to 
reduce the capital stock of the utility while lowering their tax liabilities ...?’ (quoted in 
Boffey, 2012: 6). 
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This question aligns with the role – and weakness – of regulatory oversight or intervention. 
The Thames example clearly illustrates a lack of effective governance arrangements in line 
with ideals around transparency and equality before the law.  The environmental record of the 
various privatized water companies emphasises the ineffectiveness of regulatory decision-
making. Cohen noted that in nine years up to 2013, these companies ‘polluted waterways and 
beaches about 1,000 times’ but ‘two-thirds of the spillages resulted in a caution without 
further punishment. The remaining third attracted fines of £10,800 on average.’ Cohen’s 
acerbic judgement is that ‘No private equity manager will wake up screaming at such 
sanctions.’   
This record has drawn political attention from some but little or no action. Carrington and 
Barnes (2013) have reported that cases of pollution caused by water companies ‘have 
included sewage illegally pouring into a harbour for more than a year’ and in other cases 
cover-ups occurring when managers destroyed data and ‘coerced colleagues to falsify 
records’. The authors argue that according to data gathered from the Environment Agency 
(EA) under freedom of information rules such offending shows no sign of being in decline. 
This shows not only poor decision-making by regulators when choosing which companies to 
lease public water systems to, but also a lack of effective law enforcement.  Responding to 
this record, Joan Walley M.P., Chair of the Parliamentary Environmental Audit Committee 
has said ‘In law, the ‘polluter pays’ principle is supposed to deter companies from damaging 
the environment, but in this case the penalties appear to be so pitiful that water companies 
seem to be accepting them as the price of doing business. The [UK] Sentencing Council must 
ensure that courts take into account the profits made from environmental crimes and that 
fines have a sufficient deterrent effect.’ Clearly, the state is facilitating ecological 
disorganization here through omission, which ensures that the ToP continues unaffected.  
These criticisms of privatization do not imply a naive belief that water can simply flow, from 
capturing falling rain to meeting domestic and industrial consumption demands, without cost. 
Younger (2012) addresses this matter while also pointing out that questions of supply and 
cost also raise the issue of equity, in relation to how much access and quantity different 
consumers can or should have available to them. As Younger (2012: 107) queries, ‘While few 
would argue with the principle of ensuring safe drinking water and basic sanitation for all, 
where do we draw the line?’  The response, that does not lead to byzantine and exploitative 
private arrangements, would be that publically owned water supply and sewage disposal 
services should be funded through an effective, progressive taxation system. In this way, the 
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poor have equal access to water with fewer costs while the wealthier provide most of the 
funding through tax.  
The privatization of the control of water supply, purification and delivery infrastructures 
provides one example of contemporary problems arising from turning a public good into a 
profit-yielding commodity.  Another example, extraordinary when thought about seriously, is 
how filling plastic bottles with water and selling them at a very profitable margin has become 
an enormously successful global industry.   
Bottling water for profit 
Environmental issues associated with bottled water include the release of pollutants from 
manufacturing, transporting and disposing of the bottles, the dependence on fossil fuels to 
carry out these activities and the hydrologic impacts of extracting groundwater (Gleick and 
Cooley 2008). As a result, Younger (2012: 104) describes the bottled water industry as ‘a 
scandalous waste of energy, money and carbon emissions.’ Despite these impacts and access 
to free tap water, the popularity of bottled water has generally increased in developed 
countries. Yet, bottled water is not an entirely new phenomenon. While today’s marketing of 
bottled waters plays on symbolic images of purity and claims of their contribution to physical 
and mental revitalisation, earlier trades in bottled waters made similar claims. The spiritual 
properties of holy waters were marketed to medieval pilgrims as part of a significant industry 
with brands related to sources of origin; a trend which continued in the fashion for bathing in 
and drinking spa waters in the 18th and 19th centuries (Salzman 2012: 23). Importantly, this 
changed with the introduction of better systems of water purification and the introduction of 
chlorination, leading to the early 20th century decline in the market for bottled waters. 
According to Gleick (2010a:116), today’s mass consumption of bottled water is ‘an act of 
economic, environmental and social blindness’ that is economically rational only to producers 
and retailers, not to consumers. The emphasis on consumption of bottled water has led to a 
variety of campaigns seeking to reduce bottled water demand.  
The marketing of bottled water as a healthier alternative to tap water has created distrust in 
public water supplies that in turn expands the market, and so the profit, of companies 
involved in the bottled water industry. In other words, creating this distrust, which is not 
based on evidence (see e.g. Younger 2012: 105), creates a new way to build profits in line 
with the treadmill of production. In addition, the State has played a role in reinforcing bottled 
water popularity. This is particularly evident in the case of the reduction in the provision of 
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drinking fountains in public spaces, which is closely related to building codes and regulations 
that determine if and how many water fountains are required. Across the U.S.A., New 
Zealand, the U.K. and Canada reports of fewer water fountains in public spaces have been 
made (Nelson Mail 2008; Pierre-Louis 2015; The Guardian 2010; Linton 2011). Much 
relevant academic literature focuses on the lack of water fountains in schools and possible 
links between this and the incidence of overweight children (e.g. turning to sweetened drinks 
as an alternative to water) (see e.g. Muckelbauer et al). Building code influences on the 
removal of water fountains can also be seen in cases of newly constructed stadiums across the 
U.S.A. (Gleick 2010b). For example, Duncan’s (2010: 47) analysis of an incident in 2007 at a 
new football stadium at the University of Central Florida is an interesting example of the 
reinforcement of the market for bottled water. For the first game of the season during 
summer, 45,000 people gathered in a stadium built without water fountains and with enough 
bottled water for sale for only approximately half the fans at a price of $3 per bottle. By the 
end of the game, 18 spectators had been taken away by ambulance and many more treated for 
heat stroke. The building code required only one fountain per 1000 seats ‘as long as bottled 
water was available’. As Duncan writes, the requirements of ‘the building code hint at the 
extent to which neoliberal ideas have become embedded in ... common sense reasoning’ 
(Duncan, 2010: 47-48). In other words, the idea that bottled water for a price can replace free 
water fountains strengthens the expansion of the market and shapes public perceptions 
regarding tap water. 
Concluding observations 
Ultimately, responses to water scarcity are shaped by the capitalist need to maximise profits 
and accumulate assets. The human right to water, the ecological limits of fresh water sources 
and the need for genuine sustainable development remain secondary considerations and the 
logic of privatization and economic efficiency prevails (Gleick 1998b: 571-2).  The way 
water is constructed in law and policy, as part of the commons or privately owned, 
determines what and who drives that agenda. 
By using legal doctrines, these state and corporate entities construct freshwater sources as 
something that can be owned or leased. For some regions, the privatization of water has 
enabled corporate monopolies and corrupt states to exploit a fundamental human right and 
created new forms of criminality. Arguing that such matters are of relevance to a criminology 
that should be concerned with fundamental environmental and human rights, this article 
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begins to develop a green criminological perspective on water (see also White, 2003). This 
involves exploring the ways in which corporate power, supported and sponsored by 
government initiatives and legal frameworks, monopolises an essential global resource with 
often devastating environmental and human consequences. 
Today, despite the efforts of some international and national bodies and NGOs, many still live 
in day-to-day conditions where they are unable to meet their water needs. This creates new 
degrading and damaging problems like water theft and has affected local ecologies, food 
supplies and natural aquatic systems. Yet elsewhere water is in abundance, and processing, 
bottling or piping it, makes enormous profits for the private ‘owners’ of a naturally produced 
‘public good’. Ironically, despite the fact that the market has put a value on the price of water, 
in places where it is abundant, water is often ‘de-valued’, wasted and polluted. In terms of 
crimes or harms against humanity and the planet, what we do to and with water - diverting it, 
polluting it, withholding it, privatizing it, bottling it, stealing it, and so forth – provides a 
substantial and urgent regulatory and research agenda.  
The way forward is to work for legal and governance frameworks that prioritise the human 
right to water and ecological sustainability over private interests. Such frameworks should be 
informed by user self-governance approaches (Ostrom 1990) to create institutional and 
regulatory arrangements for sustainable use of water. Whether this approach is successful 
depends on the context, yet it has proven to be effective in relation to water when it is part of 
the commons (see, e.g., Sarker et al 2014; Cordery 2010). Regardless, such an approach 
provides an avenue outside of private property rights that is worth exploring in future 
research projects.  
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